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G E O R G E Z E E S E and E M I L Y 
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E S T A T E OF M A X S I E G E L ; D A N 
S I E G E L , E V A S I E G E L , and 
W E S L E Y D. W E B B , a partnership 
d-b-a Patton's Travelers; T R A I L E R 
MART, INC., a .Nevada corporation 
d-b-a Dan's Campers N ' Trailers; and 
H U S K Y OIL COMPANY OF 
D E L A W A R E , a Delaware corporation 
Defendants-Respondents. 
R E P L Y B R I E F 
of 
G E O R G E Z E E S E and E M I L Y Z E E S E 
Defendants-Respondents, hereinafter referred to 
as defendants, in their brief, do not state the facts in 
the chronological sequence in which they occurred. This 
causes several distortions of fact. Defendants further 
raise the issues: 1) that the lease in question does not 
contain restrictive use covenants limiting the use of the 
premises to an oil and gasoline filling station and busi-
nesses incidental thereto, and 2.) that defendant Husky 
1 
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Oil Company of Delaware pleaded the defense of 
waiver and estoppel by implication. Because Plaintiffs-
Appellants, hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs, did 
not treat these issues in their original brief, this reply 
brief is filed pursuant to Rule 75 (p) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
P O I N T I 
D E F E N D A N T S ' F A I L U R E TO S T A T E 
T H E F A C T S I N T H E I R B R I E F , I N T H E 
C H R O N O L O G I C A L S E Q U E N C E I N W H I C H 
T H E Y OCCURRED, R E S U L T S I N T W O MIS-
R E P R E S E N T A T I O N S O F FACT. 
Defendants, in their brief, begin by stating facts 
which occurred in 1969 and then, through a series of 
flashbacks juxtaposed with events occurring later, ma-
terially distort the following facts: 
1) Defendants' allegation that the lease was never 
discussed by the parties and refuted by George Zeese, 
until notices to quit were served four years and two 
months after Trailer Mart, Inc., moved onto the Zeese 
property, is in error. Defendants would have this 
Court believe that George Zeese acquiesced when pre-
sented with the Estate of Max Siegel's claim to a 
$73,799.00 leasehold interest. (Exhibit 9P, the ap-
praisal) The facts are uncontroverted that when the 
appraisal was discussed during the Fall of 1972 and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the Spring of 1973, negotiations to sell the property to 
Valerie Richter, Dan Siegel's seven year old niece, 
George Zeese denied that the property was subject to 
a leasehold interest and refused to discount the selling 
price (TR. 512). Indeed, the facts are uncontroverted 
that the defendants' business agent, Dan Siegel, ac-
quiesced that the Zeese property was not subject to a 
$73,799.00 leasehold interest. In the Spring of 1973, 
he agreed to purchase the property for $150,000.00, a 
figure $7,000.00 above the appraised value of $143,-
000.00 for the entire Zeese property, as trustee for his 
niece, without discounting the selling price (See the 
terms of the proposed sale which Dan wrote on the 
back of his business card, Exhibit lOP). Therefore, 
the evidence is conclusive that the Zeeses had informed 
the defendants that the lease had lapsed. 
Defendants confuse the issue by arguing that if 
the Zeeses had responded to Eva Siegel's letter regard-
ing the exercise of the lease option on behalf of the 
Estate of Max Siegel (Exhibit 8P) , the Estate of Max 
Siegel would have probated the lease. This non sequitor 
argument is simply a smoke screen to camouflage the 
decision of Eva Siegel, as Executrix of the Estate of 
Max Siegel, to let the oil and gasoline filling station 
lease lapse rather than pay the estate taxes which 
would have been assessed against the estate if the op-
tion were exercised. 
2) Defendants' allegation that extensive improve-
ments were made by Trailer Mart, Inc., in reliance 
3 
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upon a leasehold interest, is in error. Defendants leave 
the Court with the impression that the routine main-
tenance costs expended to keep the weeds down by 
blacktopping, and the fencing to keep the garage next 
door from dumping junk onto the property are "ex-
tensive improvements" to the property which the 
Zeeses are trying to claim by forfeiting the lease. There 
is nothing in the record which indicates that these ex-
penditures have any present value, or that they were 
made to benefit the Zeeses. Indeed, a comparison of 
the aerial photograph of the property taken in April, 
1972 (Exhibit 56P) with the aerial photograph taken 
in July, 1973 (Exhibit 44P) indicates that most of these 
expenditures were made sometime after April, 1972, 
and not at the time Trailer Mart, Inc., moved onto 
the property, as alleged in defendants' brief. Presum-
ably these maintenance costs were part of Trailer Mart, 
Inc.'s change of its assumed business name from "Dan's 
Campers N ' Trailers" to "Patton's Travelers" in Feb-
ruary, 1973 (Exhibit 48P), which occurred well after 
the Zeeses indicated to the defendants that they had no 
lease. Therefore, the allegation that extensive improve-
ments have been made to the property is in error. 
In summary, defendants failure to state the facts 
in their brief, in the chronological sequence in which 
they occurred, results in two material misrepresenta-
tions of fact.1 
i One further comment regarding defendants' statement of facts 
must be made. On page 20 of defendants' brief, it is alleged 
that defendants never claimed or proved (except in their altern-
ative pleadings) that Trailer Mart, Inc., was a subtenant of the 
4 
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P O I N T I I 
T H E CONCLUSION OF L A W IS I N E R R O R 
T H A T D E F E N D A N T T R A I L E R MART, 
INC.'S U S E OF T H E P R E M I S E S F O R I T S 
B U S I N E S S D O E S NOT V I O L A T E T H E U S E 
P R O V I S I O N S C O N T A I N E D I N T H E L E A S E . 
The first conclusion of law, which was objected to 
by plaintiffs' counsel, is in error and does not properly 
reflect the District Court's decision. On page 613 of 
the transcript of the Hearing for Clarification of the 
Memorandum Decision, the District Court ruled: 
"I think it is a classic estoppel. That's the basic 
thing and I probably didn't say it in my mem-
orandum but I was kind of trying to clean up 
a few loose ends myself before I went on vaca-
tion and I was dictating into that thing. I 
cleaned up about twenty cases in one day." 
On page 621 of the transcript, the District Court re-
iterated its position that a breach had occurred, but 
that the plaintiffs were estopped from enforcing the 
breach: 
Estate of Max Siegel. Defendants further allege that at trial, 
they consistently claimed that Trailer Mart, Inc., possessed the 
premises as an assignee of Husky Oil Company of Delaware. 
Not only does this statement ignore the cross-claims filed by 
Husky Oil Company of Delaware against its assignee's suc-
cessor, the Estate of Max Siegel, it also ignores Mr. Nielsen's 
closing argument: 
"The fact of the matter is that Husky Oil Company as far 
as this evidence is concerned assigned this lease to Max 
Siegel, an individual . . ." (TR. 591) 
Only one question need be asked, "How did Trailer Mart, Inc. 
become the assignee of Husky Oil Company of Delaware?" 
5 
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"MR. D A V I S : That clarifies two points which 
were raised in our written motion. 
T H E COURT: What is the other one ? 
MR. D A V I S : The lease provisions. The use of 
the property. 
T H E COURT: Well, I think there was an estop-
pel there. I think that he knew that the property wasn't 
being used in conformance with the actual — 
MR. D A V I S : In other words, they were restrict-
ed—" 
From the foregoing, it is evident that the basis 
for the District Court's decision was estoppel. There-
fore, for an estoppel to arise, there must be, by implica-
tion, a breach of the lease covenants by the defendants' 
use of the premises. Otherwise, there is no need to in-
voke equitable doctrines to prevent the enforcement of 
a non-existent right. Consequently, the first conclusion 
of law is in error, and should have reflected that Trailer 
Mart, Inc.'s use of the premises violated the lease pro-
visions, but that plaintiffs were estopped from enforcing 
the breach. 
If the first conclusion of law is correct, the District 
Court erred in concluding that Trailer Mart, Inc.'s use 
of the premises for a trailer and recreational vehicle 
sales outlet did not violate terms of the lease. Applying 
the following four rules of construction promulgated 
by this Court, it is evident that the lease drafted by Sa-
6 
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turn Oil Company was restricted to a gasoline and oil 
filling service station operation: 
1. The entire document must be construed to inter-
pret its meaning. 
In a dispute over the assignability of an oil and 
gasoline filling station lease, this Court ruled in Power-
me Co. v. RusseWs, Inc., 103 U. 441, 135 P . 2d 906 
(1943) at page 913: 
"When possible, the court should give effect to 
all words and clauses of the lease, and construe 
the lease as a whole. United States v. Bostwick, 
94 U. S. 53, 24 L.Ed. 65; F . B. Fountain Co. v. 
Stein, 97 Conn. 619, 118 A 47, 27 A.L.R. 976; 
S. Gumble Realty and Security Co. v. L. Feible-
man and Co., 183 La. 865, 164 So. 627." 
Therefore, the following paragraphs in the lease deal-
ing with the use of the premises must be construel to-
gether to arrive at the meaning of the restrictive use 
covenants: , 
"TO H A V E AND TO H O L D all of the same 
unto Lessee, subject to the conditions herein con-
tained, and for no other purpose or business than 
that of the construction, installation, mainten-
ance and operation of the necessary buildings, 
structures, driveways, approaches, tanks, pumps, 
signs, lighting equipment, or appliances for the 
operating upon said premises the business of 
storing, marketing and distributing petroleum 
products and commodities marketed in connec-
tion therewith, for the operation of a gasoline 
7 
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and oil filling service station, a trucker's lodge, 
and a restaurant, and for the dealing in generally 
of such goods, wares, and merchandise as are 
customarily displayed, purchased and sold at the 
establishments of the type herein referred to, or 
any other lawful business." (emphasis added) 
See the last paragraph on page one of the lease. 
". . . The L E S S E E may also sublet the prem-
ises for the operation of a gasoline and oil filling 
and service station to any person or persons with-
out the consent of the LESSOR so long as the 
L E S S E E shall be liable for the faithful per-
formance of this Lease." (emphasis added) 
See the last paragraph on page two of the lease. 
". . . and it is further agreed that, should L E S -
S E E be unable to obtain the necessary building 
permits and permits for curb cuts to operate the 
business of a gasoline filling station and other 
business incidental thereto in accordance with 
LESSEE'S plans, specifications and require-
mentSj then and in that event this Lease shall, at 
the option of the L E S S E E become null and 
void. Should L E S S E E be unable at any time 
during the term of this Lease to continue to op-
erate such filling station due to any laws, Feder-
al, City or State, or rules and regulations of any 
Government authority, such inability to operate 
shall cause an abatement of the rental herein pro-
vided." (emphasis added) 
Also see the first paragraph on page five of the lease. 
The three paragraphs above clearly indicate that the 
8 
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lease was drafted to accomodate an oil and gasoline fill-
ing station operation, and other businesses incidental 
thereto. Defendants completely ignore the following 
language in the last paragraph on page one of the lease: 
"TO H A V E A N D TO H O L D all of the same 
subject to the conditions herein contained, and 
for no other purpose or business than . . / ' (em-
phasis added) 
and argue that the lease restrictions are permissive in 
nature. However, they concede that if a lease provision 
reads: 
". . . for filling station, general store, and living 
quarters and for no other purpose/' 
that the lease would be restrictive in nature as decided 
in the Britt v. Luce case, 114 S. W. 2d 267 (Tex. App. 
1938). I t is difficult to see any distinction between the 
restrictive language in the lease in dispute and the one 
in the Britt case, supra, which defendants cite on page 
18 of their brief. 
Nor does the subletting restriction found in the last 
paragraph on page two of the lease for businesses, other 
than gasoline and oil filling and service stations, make 
any sense, if there are no restrictive covenants contained 
in the lease. It is also obvious from the first paragraph 
on page five of the lease that Saturn Oil Company ne-
gotiated the lease to operate an oil and gasoline filling 
9 
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station, and other businesses incidental thereto, in ac-
cordance with its plans and specifications. 
Therefore, construing the three paragraphs togeth-
er, there is no ambiguity on the face of the lease that the 
use of the premises is restricted to the operation of an 
oil and gasoline filling station, and businesses incidental 
thereto. 
2. The intent of the parties entering into the docu-
must be ascertained. 
This Court in the Maw v. Noble case, 10 U. 2d 440, 
354 P . 2d 121 (1960) further promulgated the follow-
ing rule of construction for contracts on page 443: 
"The primary and more fundamental rule is that 
the contract must be looked at realistically in 
light of the circumstances under which it was en-
tered into, and if the intent of the parties can be 
ascertained with reasonable certainty it must be 
given effect." (emphasis added) 
The facts are undisputed that Saturn Oil Company 
drafted the lease in question, erected an oil and gasoline 
filling station on the leased premises, and operated it for 
over five years from October, 1959 through March, 
1965. Certainly the actions of the parties entering into 
the lease indicate that the premises were to be used for a 
gasoline and oil filling service station. Nor are the facts 
in dispute that J . L. Terborg & Company, and Husky 
Oil Company of Delaware continued to operate oil and 
10 
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gasoline filling service stations on the premises until 
April, 1969. Therefore, where, for more than nine years 
and seven months the premises were used exclusively 
for gasoline and oil filling service stations, there is no 
doubt that the parties entering into the original lease 
intended the lease to be restricted to an oil and gasoline 
filling service station operation. 
See Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 U. 2d 320, 266 P. 
2d 494 (1954); and California Building Co. of San 
Diego v. Halle, 80 C. A. 2d 229, 181 P . 2d 404 (1947) 
for further authority on the proposition that the conduct 
of the parties entering into a contract should be looked at 
to construe any ambiguity in the contract. I t should 
be noted that defendants misapply this rule of construc-
tion by looking to the conduct of an assignee's subtenant 
which occurred more than nine years and seven months 
after the original parties entered into the lease. 
3. Ejusdem Generis Doctrine. 
The "Ejusdem Generis" rule of construction 
adopted by this Court in Memorial Gardens of the Val-
ley, Inc. v. Love, 5 U. 2d 270, 300 P . 2d 628 (1956), 
citing 28 C.J.S. Ejusdem Generis; W. S. Hatch Co. v. 
Public Service Commission, 3 U. 2d 7, 277 P . 2d 809 
(1954) ; Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Dist. Corp., 
2 U. 2d 256, 272 P . 2d 177 (1954) negates defendants' 
contention that the phrase "or any other business" end-
ing the last paragraph on page one of the lease implies 
the right to use the lease premises in any manner. The 
11 
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ejusdem generis rule states that when specific terms are 
followed by general terms, the latter are limited to 
things of a like kind. Applying this rule to the lease 
provisions, where specific businesses which can be oper-
ated on the premises are followed by the general term 
"or any other business", this general term is limited to 
businesses of a like kind. Consequently this general 
phrase simply means that the tenant can operate busi-
nesses incidental to the operation of an oil and gasoline 
filling service station as stated in the first paragraph on 
page five of the lease above. 
See McCullough Realty v. Laemmle Film Service, 181 
Iowa 594, 165 N.W. 33 (1917) where the Iowa Court, 
in interpreting a lease, stated that the rule of construc-
tion of contracts is that a general term, or sweeping 
clause, following a specific term, is to be construed in 
light of the specific term which it follows, and is to in-
clude only matters of a like kind or nature; and further, 
the general term must be read in light of the particular 
business about which the parties were concerned when 
the lease was made. 
4. Construction of the document against the lessee 
that drafted it. 
This Court further ruled in the Powerine Co. v. 
RusselVs Inc. case, supra, that where a lease was pre-
pared by the lessee, any ambiguity in the language 
should be construed against him, as he was the one using 
the language. Therefore, where Saturn Oil Company 
12 
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drafted the lease, if there were any ambiguities in the 
restrictive covenants contained in the lease, these ambig-
uities should be construed against Saturn Oil Company, 
and its successors. For additional authority on this rule 
of construction, see Maw v. Noble, supra; and especial-
ly Shell Oil Company v. Stiffler, 87 U. 176, 48 P. 2d 
503, reh. den. 87 U. 197, 49 P . 2d 1150 (1935) where 
this Court ruled that a lease consignment service station 
contract must be most strongly construed against the 
oil company which drew the contract. The Court went 
on to state, at page 507, that there must be consideration 
moving from the company to the defendant-lessor to 
sustain a modification or waiver of the provisions of the 
contract. I t is significant that defendants, throughout 
this case, have failed to show that any benefit or consid-
eration was given to the Zeeses to modify the terms of 
the lease by their occupancy. 
In Summary, if the first conclusion of law is cor-
rect, the District Court erred, for the reasons stated 
above. 
P O I N T I I I 
H U S K Y OIL COMPANY OF DELA-
W A R E ' S S T A T E M E N T T H A T I T I M P L I E D -
L Y A R G U E D T H E D E F E N S E OF W A I V E R 
A N D E S T O P P E L IN D E F E N D I N G A G A I N S T 
P L A I N T I F F S ' C O M P L A I N T IS NOT SUP-
P O R T E D BY T H E RECORD. 
13 
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The record indicates that Husky Oil Company of 
Delaware's first defense of this lawsuit was that it had 
assigned the lease in question to Max Siegel as an in-
dividual. (TIL 591) When he died, the lease went 
into his estate so Husky Oil Company of Delaware 
cross-claimed against it for any liability resulting under 
the lease from the Estate of Max Siegel's or its subten-
ant Trailer Mart, Inc.'s operation. I" 
Husky Oil Company of Delaware's second de-
fense was that under the privity of estate doctrine, an 
assignee would not be liable for a subsequent assignee's 
conduct, if the original assignee was not bound by con-
tract to do so. Husky Oil Company of Delaware then 
went on to argue that, as an assignee, it did not assume 
all of the covenants of its assignor, and, in particular, 
the provisions of the lease which state: 
"This lease shall be assignable by the L E S S E E 
without the consent of the L E S S O R provided 
that LESSEE shall at all times be liable for the 
faithful performance of all the covenants of this 
Lease, and any assignment of the Lease as afore-
said shall not operate to release the LESSEE 
from any of its obligations hereunder" (empha-
sis added) 
This Court rejected this argument that the assignee does 
not step into the assignor's shoes to assume all of the 
terms and conditions of the lease in the Jensen v. OK 
Investment Corporation case, 29 U. 2d 281, 507 P. 2d 
14 
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713 (1973) where it ruled that an assignment of a lease 
occurs only when the entire estate passes. 
Husky Oil Company of Delaware's third defense 
was that the lease option was not exercised, so the lease 
lapsed and, therefore, it was not liable for the actions 
of the Estate of Max Siege! and its subtenant Trailer 
Mart, Inc. Plaintiffs joined in this argument and con-
ceded that if the lease had lapsed, Husky Oil Company 
of Delaware would not be liable under the provisions of 
the lease. (TR. 386, 387) 
Nowhere in the record did Husky Oil Qompany of 
Delaware argue the affirmative defense of waiver and 
estoppel. Nor is any explanation offered as to why 
Husky Oil Company of Delaware changed its defense, 
on appeal, without amending its pleadings and dismiss-
ing its cross-claims. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled 
to judgment against Husky Oil Company of Delaware, 
provided the lease is still in effect and a breach of the 
lease has occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, and in their original 
brief, plaintiffs urge this Court to reverse the judgment 
of the District Court and declare the lease void. Plain-
tiffs also request that the counterclaims of the defend-
ants be dismissed as a matter of law, and that the case 
be remanded for a determination of the damages suf-
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fered by the plaintiffs, inasmuch as defendants still 
have made no attempt to remedy their wrongful use of 
the premises. 
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